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CRACKING OPEN THE CLASSROOM DOOR: 
DEVELOPING A FIRST AMENDMENT 
STANDARD FOR CURRICULAR SPEECH 
Nicholas K. Tygesson 
ABSTRACT—Around this country, courts have found that the 
discharge of public school teachers for their classroom speech does not 
implicate the First Amendment. Others have protected this speech, but only 
by importing analytical approaches from other areas of law ill suited to the 
unique interests at play in America’s public schools. The resulting 
patchwork of doctrinal approaches provides little clarity for courts and only 
illusory protection for teachers. This Note will start from scratch, 
examining the first principles at play in public school classrooms and 
tailoring a First Amendment approach to respect the needs of government, 
teachers, and students. When determining if the First Amendment protects 
classroom speech, the teacher’s interest in speaking on matters of 
legitimate pedagogical concern should be balanced against the school’s 
interest in providing an effective educational environment 
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In 2002, Deborah Mayer accepted a teaching position at Clear Creek 
Elementary School in Bloomington, Indiana.1 Almost every Friday, Mayer 
used a newsletter—part of her approved curriculum—to teach her students 
about current events.2 During one Friday session, her class read an article 
about peace demonstrations in protest of the Iraq War.3 When one of her 
students asked whether she had ever participated in a peace march, Mayer 
responded, “When I drive past the courthouse square and the demonstrators 
are picketing I honk my horn for peace because their signs say, ‘Honk for 
Peace.’”4 The class then spent a few minutes discussing the importance of 
conflict resolution and a school program to train children to be mediators 
on the playground.5 After parents complained about the views Mayer 
expressed during this discussion, the school’s principal banned her from 
discussing peace and cancelled the school’s annual peace month.6 Mayer’s 
relationship with the principal continued to deteriorate, and the school 
 
1 See Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 1:04-CV-1695-SEB-VSS, 2006 WL 693555, 
at *2 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2006). 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
4 Id. 
5 See id. 
6 See id. at *3. 
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board did not renew her contract. She claimed she lost her job because of 
the reaction to her class discussion.7 
Elsewhere, teachers have experienced adverse employment actions 
under similar circumstances. One teacher chose to assign Herman Hesse’s 
Siddhartha—a book purchased by her school board—to her high school 
English class and was ultimately fired after parent complaints about the 
book’s allegedly offensive content.8 Another high school teacher selected a 
play for her advanced theater class that touched on issues of sexuality and 
single-parent families.9 The class performed the play at a regional 
competition and won seventeen awards.10 Although her principal had 
approved the play and she had complied with district policies, the district 
transferred the teacher to another school because of the play’s content.11 
These three educators each claimed they suffered an adverse 
employment action as a result of expression directed towards students to 
effectuate their curriculum (curricular speech).12 As a result, these teachers 
filed suit claiming that their employers acted in retaliation against the 
exercise of their First Amendment right to freedom of speech and 
expression.13 In all three cases, federal appellate courts ultimately rejected 
 
7 Id. at *3–9. 
8 See Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. (Evans-Marshall I), 428 F.3d 223, 226–30 (6th Cir. 2005). 
The court does not specify precisely what about the book was found to be offensive—presumably some 
aspect of its sexual or religious content. 
9 See Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 366 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 375–76 (Motz, J., dissenting) (“Taking all of these allegations together, a fair reading of 
them is that Boring complied with the school administration’s requirements and policies in every 
respect . . . .”). 
12 For the purposes of this Note, curriculum will be defined as “all planned school activities 
including . . . courses of study, organized play, athletics, dramatics, clubs, and homeroom program.” Id. 
at 367–68 (majority opinion) (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 557 
(1971)). Accord Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (viewing a student newspaper 
as part of the curriculum). As speech has been construed by the Court to go beyond words spoken or 
written by the speaker, curricular speech includes all expressive activities of an educator used in 
implementing the educator’s curriculum, including choice of materials and media. Cf. Texas v. Johnson, 
491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“[W]e have acknowledged that conduct may be ‘sufficiently imbued with 
elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.’” (quoting 
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (per curiam))). This definition specifically excludes 
speech made by teachers related to other aspects of employment, which would continue to be analyzed 
under the current government employee speech framework. See infra Part I.A.1. 
13 Often, the issue of whether an educator’s First Amendment rights were violated arises when a 
public employee claims the employee suffered an adverse employment action because the employee 
exercised his or her rights. Whether an employee engaged in protected activity—in these cases, the 
exercise of the First Amendment right to free speech—is only the first element of a successful 
retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally, a plaintiff must successfully demonstrate that 
the plaintiff suffered “an injury that would likely chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in 
that [protected] activity” and that the adverse action was substantially motivated by the protected 
conduct. Evans-Marshall I, 428 F.3d at 228 (quoting Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 
1048 (6th Cir. 2001)). For additional discussion of the causation prong, see infra note 47. 
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the notion that the teachers’ circumstances triggered First Amendment 
protection.14 
These cases demonstrate the troubled state of First Amendment 
protection for educators. First, school districts can discharge teachers for 
using their professional judgment in exposing students to culturally 
significant topics, often with the permission of their administration. 
Teaching is dynamic, and teachers are expected to engage young people 
with stimulating ideas and instruction. As they grow older, students 
frequently inquire about important, and at times controversial, topics 
related to religion, politics, and sexuality. While teachers should not be 
allowed to use their classrooms to proselytize to a captive audience, neglect 
the topic they are hired to teach, or expose students to materials 
inappropriate for their age, they should be encouraged to introduce 
America’s youth to diverse perspectives and experiences vital to the 
success of a democratic society. Using contemporary, engaging, and 
relevant materials can increase student achievement across disciplines. 
Teachers have recently come under increased public scrutiny and pressure 
as reformers seek to improve public schools. The focus on improving test 
scores to comply with No Child Left Behind15 as well as movements 
opposing tenure16 and unionization17 have already lessened teachers’ 
autonomy; fear of retaliation for effectuating their curriculum in a 
reasonable manner need not further that trend.18 
Second, the outcome in these cases may have differed had they arisen 
elsewhere in the United States. Federal circuit courts have applied no fewer 
than four distinct doctrinal approaches to determine whether the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause protects curricular speech: 
 
14 See Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. (Evans-Marshall II), 624 F.3d 332, 334, 344 (6th Cir. 2010); 
Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007); Boring, 136 F.3d at 368. 
15 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) was passed to 
improve American education by implementing standards-based reforms. See No Child Left Behind, 
EDUC. WEEK (published Aug. 4, 2004; updated Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/no-
child-left-behind/. NCLB makes federal education funding contingent on states implementing 
standardized tests that allow the tracking of assessment data for individual students. See id. Failure to 
meet annual goals for improving test scores may result in punishment, including state takeovers of a 
failing school. See id. 
16 See, e.g., M.J. Stephey, A Brief History of Tenure, TIME (Nov. 17, 2008), http://www.time.com/
time/nation/article/0,8599,1859505,00.html (discussing the efforts of Michelle Rhee—former head of 
Washington, D.C.’s public schools—to abolish tenure). 
17 See, e.g., George F. Will, Op-Ed, Liberals’ Waterloo, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2011, at A15 
(discussing a political controversy in Wisconsin that included teachers’ collective bargaining rights). 
18 It has been suggested that this confluence of factors has contributed to a 15% drop in teacher job 
satisfaction over the past two years. See Kevin Welner, Teacher Job Satisfaction Plummets (Perhaps 
Teacher-Bashing Isn’t Productive), HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 7, 2012, 10:35 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/kevin-welner/teacher-job-satisfaction-_b_1312266.html. 
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(1) the Pickering balancing test, which protects speech made by a 
public employee when speaking as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern;19 
(2) the Pickering–Garcetti approach, which applies the Pickering test 
but finds all speech made pursuant to a government employee’s official 
duties as outside the scope of the First Amendment;20 
(3) the Hazelwood test, which states that schools can restrict 
educators’ speech based on a legitimate pedagogical concern;21 and 
(4) the Rust approach, which views curricular speech as government 
speech that affords the speaker no First Amendment protection.22 
Furthermore, different circuits have applied identical tests in radically 
different ways.23 Alternative First Amendment protections under the banner 
of academic freedom24 or a student’s right to be exposed to diverse ideas25 
are tenuous at best. This total uncertainty can chill educators’ speech and 
hamper their ability to find creative ways to engage young people without 
jeopardizing their careers.26 
This Note will attempt to disentangle this convoluted doctrine and 
propose a new standard for the analysis of K–12 educators’ free speech 
rights. When determining if the First Amendment protects curricular 
speech, the teacher’s interest in speaking on matters of legitimate 
pedagogical concern should be balanced against the school’s interest in 
providing an effective educational environment. Additionally, the proposed 
analysis will be specifically tailored to the realities of the schoolhouse.27 In 
 
19 See, e.g., Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 168 (3d Cir. 2008); Lee v. 
York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694 n.11 (4th Cir. 2007); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 
890 F.2d 794, 799 (5th Cir. 1989). 
20 See, e.g., Evans-Marshall II, 624 F.3d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 2010); Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. 
Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 478–80 (7th Cir. 2007). 
21 See, e.g., Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 1998); Silano v. 
Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 722–23 (2d Cir. 1994); Ward v. Hickey, 
996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 775–79 (10th Cir. 1991). 
22 See, e.g., Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000). 
23 Compare Evans-Marshall I, 428 F.3d 223, 231 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that controversial 
curricular speech was a matter of public concern), with Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 799–802 (finding that 
controversial curricular speech was not a matter of public concern). 
24 See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
25 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 
26 See Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers’ Classroom Speech and the First Amendment, 
30 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 7 (2001) (“In the absence of a Supreme Court decision clarifying teachers’ rights, in-
class speech is chilled and the balance of interests between school boards and teachers is impermissibly 
tilted in favor of the former.”). 
27 A number of other commentators have put forth new modes of analysis for curricular speech 
claims that focus primarily on the addition of a notice requirement to existing approaches. See, e.g., id. 
at 52; Kimberly Gee, Establishing a Constitutional Standard that Protects Public School Teacher 
Classroom Expression, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 409, 412–13 (2009); Kevin G. Welner, Locking Up the 
Marketplace of Ideas and Locking Out School Reform: Courts’ Imprudent Treatment of Controversial 
Teaching in America’s Public Schools, 50 UCLA L. REV. 959, 1022–29 (2003). While incorporating 
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proposing this test, this Note works within existing Supreme Court doctrine 
while seeking to balance the interests of teachers, government, and 
students. 
This Note will proceed in four parts. Part I discusses the current 
approaches to analyzing curricular speech under the Free Speech Clause 
and the related concepts of academic freedom and a student’s “right to 
hear.” Part II outlines the general principles and particularized concerns 
implicated by curricular speech. Part III proposes a new standard to 
evaluate curricular speech protection that incorporates the basic principles 
and concerns discussed in Part II, demonstrates how the test would be 
applied, and explores its benefits. Part IV concludes. 
I. FIRST AMENDMENT APPROACHES TO CURRICULAR SPEECH 
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech.”28 The application of First Amendment 
protections to public employees has evolved greatly over the last century. 
Until the 1960s, the government had broad latitude in restricting the 
constitutional rights of its employees.29 Oliver Wendell Holmes succinctly 
articulated this position, writing that a police officer “may have a 
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman.”30 Likewise, the Supreme Court offered little in the way of First 
Amendment protection to public employees. In Adler v. Board of 
Education, the Court upheld a New York law prohibiting members of 
“subversive groups,” such as the Communist Party, from being employed 
by public schools.31 
This paradigm shifted following the Court’s 1967 decision in 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents.32 Overruling its decision in Adler, the Court 
struck down laws requiring faculty at state universities to sign a certificate 
 
notice, this Note goes beyond previous efforts by creating a test that delineates protected and 
unprotected speech on the merits of the expression itself. 
28 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment has been the primary constitutional provision used 
to provide some level of protection to teaching in the United States. A number of other nations have 
explicit textual commitments to protecting teaching and academic inquiry in their constitutions. See, 
e.g., GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], 
May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 5(3) (Ger.) (stating that “[a]rt and science, research and teaching shall be 
free” under the German Basic Law); Art. 33 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (stating that “[a]rt and science and 
the teaching of them shall enjoy complete freedom” under the Italian Constitution). 
29 See Martha M. McCarthy & Suzanne E. Eckes, Silence in the Hallways: The Impact of Garcetti 
v. Ceballos on Public School Educators, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 209, 210 (2008); see also Connick v. 
Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (“For most of this century, the unchallenged dogma was that a public 
employee had no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment—including those 
which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights.”). 
30 McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
31 342 U.S. 485, 485–93 (1952) (“Has the State thus deprived them of any right to free speech or 
assembly? We think not.”). 
32 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
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stating they were not communists, explaining that “[b]ecause First 
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may 
regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.”33 The Court rejected “the 
theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be 
subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable.”34 
By protecting the rights of public employees generally, Keyishian 
opened the door for the development of more refined analyses of First 
Amendment claims concerning curricular speech.35 However, the Court has 
yet to rule on a case involving a K–12 teacher’s curricular speech.36 The 
Court’s lack of guidance has resulted in federal circuit courts using a 
hodgepodge of approaches to determine whether the First Amendment 
shields this expression. Three distinct strands of First Amendment doctrine 
provide potential protection for curricular speech: free speech, academic 
freedom, and the right to hear. 
A. Free Speech Standards for Curricular Speech 
Given the absence of Supreme Court direction, lower courts have 
imported analytical frameworks from different areas of First Amendment 
free speech law into the curricular speech context. Each approach 
employed in the circuits reflects one element of the relationship between a 
teacher and the state. The Pickering line of cases balances the interests of 
government as sovereign and employer. Hazelwood examines the interests 
of the state in education. Meanwhile, Rust focuses on the state controlling 
the message of programs it funds. Each of these tests is appealing because 
it captures an important element of the educational setting: teachers are 
government employees, public schools are at the heart of our education 
system, and state, local, and national governments provide nearly all 
funding for public education. However, each test fails to capture all of 
these interests at once. Thus, a split developed in the circuit courts and each 
approach requires examination. 
1. Teacher as Public Employee: Pickering and  
Garcetti.—Pickering’s public employee speech framework is the 
most commonly used tool used by courts to analyze curricular speech. In 
1968, the Court announced its landmark decision in Pickering v. Board of 
Education.37 In Pickering, a public school teacher lost his job after writing 
a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the board of education and 
 
33 Id. at 604 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
34 Id. at 605–06 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1965)). 
35 See id. at 606 (“It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may 
be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.” (quoting Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963))). 
36 Daly, supra note 26, at 6. 
37 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
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superintendent for their handling of a bond referendum and financial 
expenditures.38 Eschewing the standard public forum analysis due to the 
state’s dual interests as employer and sovereign, the Court set up a test 
balancing the employee’s interest “as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services.”39 Emphasizing that each 
application of this test must be context specific, the Court looked to 
whether the statements would make it difficult to “maintain[] either 
discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers” as well 
as interfere with the “performance of his daily duties in the classroom 
or . . . with the regular operation of the schools generally.”40 Despite 
numerous factual errors in the letter, the Court held that the First 
Amendment protected the teacher’s speech unless he knew the statements 
were false or exhibited a reckless disregard for the truth. The teacher’s 
speech had touched on a matter of public concern and did not interfere with 
his ability to do his job; thus, the First Amendment protected the letter’s 
contents.41 
Initially, courts granted increasingly broad First Amendment 
protection to public employees.42 The Supreme Court extended this 
protection to private conversations,43 and lower courts protected educators’ 
First Amendment rights to wear black armbands to protest the Vietnam 
War,44 comment publicly on collective bargaining agreements,45 and 
criticize school policies.46 The Court also designed a framework to analyze 
causation in First Amendment retaliation cases.47 However, the Court soon 
began to limit these protections. First, in Connick v. Meyers, it added 
greater scrutiny and rigor to determining what qualifies as a matter of 
 
38 See id. at 565–68. 
39 Id. at 568; see also Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“However, the Supreme Court has held that where the government acts as both sovereign and 
employer, this general forum-based analysis does not apply.”). 
40 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570, 572–73 (footnote omitted). 
41 See id. at 573–75. 
42 See McCarthy & Eckes, supra note 29, at 211. 
43 See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979) (describing a teacher 
who voiced concerns about racial discrimination in the school to her principal); see also Rankin v. 
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 392 (1987) (protecting a statement made during a private conversation). 
44 See James v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 572–76 (2d Cir. 1972). 
45 See McGill v. Bd. of Educ., 602 F.2d 774, 778–79 (7th Cir. 1979). 
46 See Lemons v. Morgan, 629 F.2d 1389, 1390–91 (8th Cir. 1980); Bernasconi v. Tempe 
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 3, 548 F.2d 857, 861–62 (9th Cir. 1977). 
47 This framework was announced in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (discussing the First Amendment suit by a teacher who claimed he was 
fired for publicly criticizing a dress code implemented by his school’s principal). First, the plaintiff was 
required to show that his constitutionally protected conduct was a “motivating factor” in causing an 
adverse employment action. Id. Then, the defendant would have the opportunity to show she would 
have taken the same action absent the protected conduct. Id. 
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public concern.48 The Court distinguished what it viewed as mere 
“employee grievances” from true matters of public concern that touch on 
issues “of political, social, or other concern of the community.”49 
The Court implemented a more striking limitation on public employee 
speech protection in Garcetti v. Ceballos.50 Richard Ceballos was a deputy 
district attorney in Los Angeles County.51 During an investigation, he wrote 
a memo to his supervisors criticizing the veracity of an affidavit underlying 
a search warrant used to gather evidence in their case.52 The district 
attorney’s office proceeded with the prosecution, and Ceballos alleged he 
was subjected to retaliatory employment actions because he voiced concern 
in the memo.53 
In evaluating this claim, the Court applied and refined the Pickering 
standard.54 In a five-to-four decision authored by Justice Kennedy, the 
Court rejected Garcetti’s claim. Much as Connick did for the notion of a 
“matter of public concern,” the Court further defined and emphasized the 
“citizen” component of the Pickering standard: “[W]hen public employees 
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution 
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”55 
For educators, curricular speech is by its very definition pursuant to 
their official duties—applying Garcetti to teachers would effectively 
nullify their First Amendment protection. However, Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion explicitly did not reach issues related to “academic freedom.”56 
Because “classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional 
interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary 
employee-speech jurisprudence,” the Court declined to determine whether 
this analysis would apply to scholarship or teaching.57 
It is uncertain whether Justice Kennedy’s caveat was intended to apply 
to educators in K–12 schools as opposed to only those in higher education. 
The plain language of the opinion appears to exempt both “classroom 
instruction” and “teaching” from the Garcetti analysis, leaving the door 
 
48 461 U.S. 138, 140–42, 154 (1983) (holding that a district attorney who circulated a questionnaire 
asking about office morale and supervisor competency was not entitled to First Amendment protection). 
49 Id. at 146–47. 
50 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
51 Id. at 413. 
52 See id. at 413–14. 
53 See id. at 414–15. 
54 See id. at 417–21. 
55 Id. at 421. The Court did state that “[t]he First Amendment protects some expressions related to 
the speaker’s job” and “expressions made at work” in accord with Givhan. Id. at 420–21 (discussing 
Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979)). However, the exact nature of these 
remaining protections was not defined. 
56 Id. at 425. 
57 Id. 
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open for protection of K–12 educators’ curricular speech. However, the 
relevant passage appears to respond to criticism leveled by Justice Souter in 
dissent that argued the majority’s holding may “imperil First Amendment 
protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities.”58 
Additionally, the concept of academic freedom has primarily been applied 
to the university setting.59 This uncertainty has led to two different 
applications of the public employee speech framework to curricular speech: 
one embracing Kennedy’s caveat and applying pre-Garcetti standards 
(Pickering) and the other applying Garcetti (Pickering–Garcetti) in full 
force. 
a. The Pickering approach.—Although Pickering itself involved 
a teacher’s off-campus speech, several circuits have applied this test to 
educators’ speech within the schoolhouse.60 At present, the Third,61 
Fourth,62 and Fifth63 Circuits apply the Pickering framework without 
Garcetti’s additional requirements.64 Before switching approaches in light 
of Garcetti, the Sixth Circuit applied Pickering.65 These Sixth Circuit cases, 
while no longer controlling, still provide insight into the application of the 
Pickering standard. 
Courts employing Pickering have further split on whether the First 
Amendment protects curricular speech. These courts have differed on 
whether controversial curricular speech can touch on a matter of public 
 
58 Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
59 See infra Part I.B. 
60 Some cases and articles have referred to this test, which applies pre-Garcetti public employee 
speech law, as “Pickering–Connick.” See Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 
1149 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001); Alexander Wohl, Oiling the Schoolhouse Gate: After Forty Years of Tinkering 
with Teachers’ First Amendment Rights, Time for a New Beginning, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1285, 1302 
(2009). In the interest of brevity, this Note will use Pickering to refer to pre-Garcetti doctrine and 
Pickering–Garcetti to refer to current employee speech doctrine. 
61 See Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 168 (3d Cir. 2008). 
62 See Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694 n.11 (4th Cir. 2007); Boring v. Buncombe 
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368–69 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
63 See Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 799 (5th Cir. 1989). 
64 The exact impact of the Garcetti decision in this area is still evolving and uncertain. Two courts 
have declined to reach the question of Garcetti’s application to curricular speech because the decision 
itself was unclear on that point and the speech at issue would not be protected even under preexisting 
standards. See Panse v. Eastwood, 303 F. App’x 933, 935 (2d Cir. 2008) (reasoning that because the 
plaintiff’s claim would fail under Hazelwood, the court “need not resolve the issue of whether Garcetti 
or some other standard applies here”); Borden, 523 F.3d at 171 n.13 (reasoning that because a coach’s 
participation in a student-led prayer was not a matter of public concern under Pickering, the court need 
not decide whether Garcetti applies in the educational context). The Fourth Circuit more explicitly 
addressed the issue, stating: “The Court explicitly did not decide whether [Garcetti] would apply in the 
same manner to a case involving speech related to teaching. Thus, we continue to apply the Pickering–
Connick standard . . . .” Lee, 484 F.3d at 694 n.11 (citation omitted). The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits view Garcetti as controlling, see infra Part I.A.1.b, while the First, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have not addressed the issue since Garcetti. 
65 Evans-Marshall I, 428 F.3d 223, 228 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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concern—some viewing it instead as an internal grievance—and if teachers 
must be speaking as citizens in order to be protected.66 In Evans-Marshall 
v. Board of Education of Tipp City Exempted Village School District 
(Evans-Marshall I), the literary works being discussed—To Kill a 
Mockingbird, Fahrenheit 451, and Siddhartha—explored numerous 
culturally significant themes such as race, justice, gender, and power.67 The 
court stated that these themes touched on matters of public concern and 
noted that “the Supreme Court has never removed in-class speech from its 
presumptive place within the ambit of the First Amendment.”68 Thus, the 
analysis could proceed to the balancing of interests.69 
However, other courts have reasoned that curricular speech is 
inherently lacking expressive content, and thus unrelated to matters of 
public concern. In Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education, 
Margaret Boring chose the play Independence, featuring controversial 
issues including homosexuality, for students in her class to perform at a 
competition.70 The court held that conflict resulting from the selection and 
performance of the play did “not present a matter of public concern and is 
nothing more than an ordinary employment dispute.”71 Instead of viewing 
the play as expression in and of itself, the court reasoned that her speech 
was about the choice of curriculum. 
While the line between protected expression and unprotected 
employment disputes rightly should be drawn, courts often fail to do so 
correctly by ignoring the reasons for adverse employment actions. For 
example, suppose a teacher decides to employ a book in her American 
literature class. Her principal later punishes her because she assigned the 
book. One can imagine reasons for the teacher’s firing that should not 
implicate the First Amendment because they are not based on protected 
expression. The teacher could have assigned The Great Gatsby when she 
was required to teach Death of a Salesman. She could have failed to 
consult the principal before selecting a new book in contradiction of school 
policy. Both of these scenarios are rightly characterized as run-of-the-mill 
employment disputes because the decisions were based on the teacher’s 
insubordination rather than the content of the curricular speech. On the 
other hand, if the firing were based on the teacher’s expression of the 
book’s ideas, the principal would clearly be reacting to the content of that 
 
66 See id. at 234–36 (Sutton, J., concurring); Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 799–800. 
67 428 F.3d at 226–37. 
68 Id. at 229. This holding was reversed after Garcetti. See Evans-Marshall II, 624 F.3d 332 (6th 
Cir. 2010). 
69 Evans-Marshall I, 428 F.3d at 231. 
70 136 F.3d 364, 366–68 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Boring was transferred against her wishes for 
her choice of the play despite “compl[ying] with the school administration’s requirements and policies 
in every respect.” Id. at 375–76 (Motz, J., dissenting). 
71 Id. at 368 (majority opinion). 
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speech. In that situation, the courts should determine whether that content 
touches on a matter of public concern. However, some courts, like that in 
Boring, appear to stop short of looking at the principal’s motivation, 
instead viewing any dispute over curriculum as per se devoid of expressive 
content. 
Additionally, the circuits have differed on the importance of speaking 
as a “citizen” to the Pickering balance. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that as 
long as speech related to a matter of public concern, it was insignificant 
whether the teacher was speaking as a public employee or private citizen.72 
The Fifth Circuit held differently, denying First Amendment protection to 
the content of a reading list used by a high school history teacher. The court 
stated that the teacher “did not speak out as a citizen when he offered a 
separate body of material.”73 
While theoretically applying the same test, these courts have taken 
fundamentally different approaches to defining the protection of curricular 
speech. Two main factors divide these circuits. First, they differ on what it 
means to speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern; while the Sixth 
Circuit views the “matter of public concern” language as determinative, the 
Fourth and Fifth Circuits also require the teacher to be speaking as a 
citizen. Second, they differ in how to characterize curricular decisions. A 
curricular decision can be viewed as expression, the substance of which can 
touch on a matter of public concern, or solely as a workplace decision 
divorced from its content. This characterization is important: conflict over 
the former implicates free speech protection while the latter, simply the 
ability to make a choice at work, does not trigger constitutional protections. 
While courts employing Pickering have been inconsistent in its application, 
unlike Pickering–Garcetti, it still theoretically protects curricular speech. 
b. Pickering–Garcetti.—In the years since Garcetti, the Sixth,74 
Seventh,75 and Ninth76 Circuits have adopted the Pickering–Garcetti 
 
72 See Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1051–53 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he key 
question is not whether a person is speaking in his role as an employee or a citizen, but whether the 
employee’s speech in fact touches on matters of public concern.”). This case involved a fifth grade 
teacher in Kentucky who hosted a presentation by Woody Harrelson, in conjunction with a CNN 
special, in her classroom to discuss industrial hemp. See id. at 1041–43. Despite obtaining prior 
permission from her principal, the teacher was fired after a number of community members complained 
about the presentation. See id. at 1045. The court ultimately found that her speech was protected by the 
First Amendment. See id. at 1055. 
73 Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989). 
74 See Evans-Marshall II, 624 F.3d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 2010). 
75 See Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 478–80 (7th Cir. 2007). This court 
differentiated the speech of post-secondary educators and those in primary and secondary education, 
stating “[h]ow much room is left for constitutional protection of scholarly viewpoints in post-secondary 
education was left open in Garcetti and Piggee and need not be resolved today.” Id. at 480; see also 
Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 670–72 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating the Garcetti decision did 
not apply to a post-secondary teacher’s claim). 
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approach. The Seventh Circuit’s analysis of curricular speech issues has 
seen the greatest impact from Garcetti, as the court previously applied the 
Hazelwood student speech standard.77 
Pickering–Garcetti likely affords no protection for curricular speech. 
Garcetti placed all speech made by public employees pursuant to their 
official duties outside the protection of the First Amendment. As 
implementing a curriculum is the primary job of a teacher, curricular 
speech is per se made pursuant to a teacher’s official duties and thus lacks 
protection against retaliation. Courts may, as they have in other contexts, 
try to circumvent Garcetti by so narrowly defining employees’ official 
duties that their conduct is not technically pursuant to their employment.78 
For instance, a math teacher’s role may be to deliver a board-approved 
algebra curriculum. Accordingly, commenting on current events would not 
be pursuant to his official duties—current events generally have little to do 
with mathematics instruction. This sort of maneuver seems unlikely in the 
area of curricular speech where delivering instruction to a class is the 
quintessential duty of a teacher.79 It would also lead to paradoxical results; 
a current events teacher discussing a political controversy would not be 
protected while a science teacher could be. 
The public employee speech analysis found in the Pickering line of 
precedent has become the most common test among federal circuit courts. 
However, a number of circuits have also used the student speech 
framework to evaluate curricular speech claims. 
2. Student Speech: The Hazelwood Standard.—While the Hazelwood 
standard was initially developed to determine the free speech rights of 
students within schools, several circuits have also applied it to teachers’ 
classroom speech. Generally, this test allows restriction of curricular 
speech for legitimate pedagogical reasons. The First,80 Second,81 Eighth,82 
 
76 See Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 966 & n.12 (9th Cir. 2011). 
77 Compare Mayer, 474 F.3d at 477–80 (applying Pickering–Garcetti), with Webster v. New 
Lennox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Hazelwood). 
78 See, e.g., Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 595 F.3d 1126, 1130–37 (10th Cir. 
2010). The court held that a speech pathologist was not acting pursuant to her official duties in 
reporting to the state that she was not being given an accurate list of students needing services. See id. at 
1135–37. The court reasoned that reporting violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA) to the state department of education was not pursuant to her official duties because she was not 
hired as an IDEA compliance officer and the reporting happened outside of her normal chain of 
command. See id. 
79 The Ninth Circuit soundly rejected this sort of argument where a math teacher posted banners in 
his classroom that took historical texts out of context to promote a religious message. See Johnson, 658 
F.3d at 954, 968 (“Rather, because of the position of trust and authority they hold and the 
impressionable young minds with which they interact, teachers necessarily act as teachers for purposes 
of a Pickering inquiry when at school or a school function, in the general presence of students, in a 
capacity one might reasonably view as official.”). 
80 See Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993). 
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and Tenth83 Circuits use this standard.84 Additionally, the Seventh85 and 
Ninth86 Circuits had employed this test before Garcetti. 
The Supreme Court first protected students’ free speech rights in 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.87 In Tinker, 
the Court held that the First Amendment shielded the right of students to 
wear armbands to protest the Vietnam War, stating: “It can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”88 
The Court elaborated on students’ rights within the schoolhouse in 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.89 Unlike the very personal 
expression found in Tinker, the student speech at issue in Hazelwood 
appeared in a school newspaper.90 The school’s principal removed an 
article focusing on teen pregnancy from the paper before publication. In 
holding that the article lacked First Amendment protection, the Court 
reasoned that the newspaper was not a public forum.91 Thus, the school 
officials retained the power to control speech that “the public might 
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school[,] . . . so long as 
their actions [were] reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”92 
Reasoning that teachers’ curricular speech also bears the “imprimatur 
of the school,” a number of circuits have applied Hazelwood’s legitimate 
 
81 See Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 722–23 (2d Cir. 
1994). 
82 See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 1998). 
83 See Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 775–79 (10th Cir. 1991). 
84 It should again be noted that the First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have not addressed curricular 
speech in light of Garcetti. The Seventh Circuit’s move from Hazelwood to Pickering–Garcetti in 
Mayer, written by Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook, highlights the possibility that other courts may do the 
same. See Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007). 
85 See Webster v. New Lennox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1990). 
86 See Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1148–49 (9th Cir. 2001). 
87 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
88 Id. While the facts of Tinker limit its holding to the rights of students, the Court used broad 
language in describing the First Amendment protections for both students and teachers within the 
school setting. See id. (“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the 
school environment, are available to teachers and students.”). 
89 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
90 See id. at 262–64. 
91 See id. at 267–70. The court also mentioned in dicta that “public schools do not possess all of the 
attributes of streets, parks, and other traditional public forums that ‘time out of mind, have been used 
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.’” 
Id. at 267 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality opinion)). This Note proceeds on 
the assumption that the classroom during instruction time is not a public forum and thus is subject to 
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral restrictions on speech. 
92 Id. at 271, 273. 
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pedagogical concern test to teachers’ curricular speech.93 In applying 
Hazelwood, courts have upheld restrictions on educators discussing school 
gossip,94 allowing students to use profanity in class projects,95 and showing 
videos containing nudity.96 
The First Circuit developed the most comprehensive approach to 
teachers’ speech under Hazelwood. In Ward v. Hickey, the court analogized 
the classroom setting to the school newspaper in Hazelwood; neither are 
public forums, and therefore the school can reasonably restrict speech.97 
Additionally, both a teacher’s instructional speech and a student newspaper 
are part of the curriculum.98 
Having tied the analysis of teachers’ curricular speech into 
Hazelwood’s reasoning, the First Circuit applied a two-part test based on 
the Supreme Court’s holding. The school “may regulate a teacher’s 
classroom speech if: (1) the regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate 
pedagogical concern; and (2) the school provided the teacher with notice of 
what conduct was prohibited.”99 The court elaborated on the first element, 
taken expressly from Hazelwood, by articulating factors to guide what 
pedagogical concerns are reasonable, including the “age and sophistication 
of the students, the relationship between teaching method and valid 
educational objective, and the context and manner of the presentation.”100 
The notice prong of this test was inferred from Hazelwood and is 
unique to the First Circuit.101 Hazelwood’s statement that prepublication 
control of a school newspaper’s content need not be pursuant to express 
regulation “suggests that the Court would agree that postpublication 
retaliation must derive from some prior limitation.”102 In determining 
whether a teacher is on notice, the court examined whether, based on prior 
communications, it was “reasonable for the school to expect the teacher to 
know that her conduct was prohibited.”103 This standard does not require an 
 
93 See Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 776 (10th Cir. 1991) (“We are convinced that if 
students’ expression in a school newspaper bears the imprimatur of the school, then a teacher’s 
expression in the ‘traditional classroom setting’ also bears the imprimatur of the school.” (quoting 
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271)). 
94 See id. at 774, 779 (describing a teacher commenting to his class about a rumor that two students 
had been caught “making out on the tennis court”). 
95 See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718, 719 (8th Cir. 1998). 
96 See Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 721, 723 (2d Cir. 
1994) (describing a guest speaker in a mathematics class using a video featuring a topless woman to 
demonstrate the phenomenon of “persistence of vision”). 
97 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 452 (citations omitted). 
100 Id. at 453. These factors to determine legitimate pedagogical interests have also been adopted 
by the Second Circuit. See Silano, 42 F.3d at 722–23. 
101 See Daly, supra note 26, at 22–23. 
102 Ward, 996 F.2d at 453. 
103 Id. at 454. 
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explicit prohibition of “every imaginable inappropriate conduct by 
teachers,” only that they would reasonably know their conduct was 
inappropriate.104 
While the First Circuit’s test, particularly the notice requirement, does 
provide some protection for teachers, other courts have been less rigorous 
in applying Hazelwood. Often, these courts fail to define what constitutes a 
legitimate pedagogical concern and instead merely defer to school 
administrators.105 Despite these issues, the Hazelwood test still offers 
greater potential protection than afforded by courts applying Rust. 
3. Government as Speaker: The Rust Approach.—In a far less 
common and more tenuous approach, some courts have imported the First 
Amendment analysis in Rust v. Sullivan and its progeny into the context of 
curricular speech.106 Under this approach, the government subsidizes 
teachers’ curricular speech in order to convey a particular message; 
teachers in the classroom are essentially paid to speak on behalf of the 
government. Thus, governmental entities (like school boards) can define 
the scope of a teacher’s speech without violating the First Amendment—
they are simply choosing what speech to subsidize and preventing their 
message from being distorted.107 While not explicitly adopting Rust as 
controlling precedent, this general approach has influenced decisions in the 
Third108 and Ninth109 Circuits.110 However, the most recent decisions in 
these circuits have employed the Pickering test.111 
 
104 Id. 
105 See Daly, supra note 26, at 13. 
106 500 U.S. 173 (1991). In many ways, this Note uses Rust as shorthand for a general approach 
that is better developed in theory than in practice. It has been suggested that Rust be explicitly adopted 
in all curricular speech cases. See Emily White Kirsch, Note, First Amendment Protection of Teachers’ 
Instructional Speech: Extending Rust v. Sullivan to Ensure that Teachers Do Not Distort the 
Government Message, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 185, 187 (2010). 
107 See Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1149 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Under 
Rust–Rosenberger, when the government is the speaker, in the sense that the government is conveying a 
particular message through a person, that person receives no First Amendment protection.”). 
108 See Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990). 
109 See Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000). 
110 These cases employ the general idea that curricular speech is government speech and thus the 
government can regulate it as it sees fit. Neither case explicitly states that Rust is controlling—the Third 
Circuit decision in Bradley actually predates Rust. 
111 See Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 960–61 (9th Cir. 2011); Borden v. Sch. 
Dist. of the Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2008). Johnson discussed this line of 
cases as informative in applying Pickering. Johnson, 658 F.3d at 957 (“[A teacher] speaks not as an 
individual, but as a public employee, and the school district is free to ‘take legitimate and appropriate 
steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted.’” (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995))). Indeed, the court categorically distinguished 
between speech of a private individual that could reasonably bear the imprimatur of the school (citing 
Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 697 (4th Cir. 2007), as standing for the “curricular speech 
doctrine”) and the state’s ability to speak through “the mouthpiece of one of its employees” (citing 
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The seminal case in this line is Rust v. Sullivan.112 In Rust, private 
healthcare providers initiated a First Amendment challenge to a federal 
regulation that banned funding of family planning services that offered 
abortion counseling.113 In finding that the regulations did not violate the 
free speech rights of healthcare workers, the Court reasoned that Congress 
can define the scope of a discretionary government program as it sees fit; 
“the Government may choose not to subsidize speech.”114 This reasoning 
was stated even more directly in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of 
University of Virginia.115 When funding a project, the government “may 
take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither 
garbled nor distorted.”116 As a logical extension of this reasoning, “when 
the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices.”117 
As the government funds public schools and pays teachers’ salaries, 
courts have reasoned that the government may dictate the speech of 
educators without violating the First Amendment. In a decision citing both 
Rust and Rosenberger, the court in Downs v. Los Angeles Unified School 
District rejected protection for curricular speech.118 The court reasoned that 
because a teacher’s choice to put articles on a bulletin board was a 
“manifestation of the school board’s policy,” the teacher was speaking as 
the government.119 Thus, the speech “is not subject to the constraints of 
constitutional safeguards and forum analysis, but instead is measured by 
practical considerations applicable to any individual’s choice of how to 
 
Downs, 228 F.3d at 1012). Id. at 966 n.11. While the former is subject to scrutiny for viewpoint 
neutrality, the latter is not. See id. 
112 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
113 See id. at 177–82. This case involved a requirement in Title X of the Public Health Services Act 
that authorized funding family planning services—often carried out through contracts with private 
groups—pursuant to regulations. See id. at 178–81. The Act also specified that Title X funds should be 
used only for preventative family planning. Id. A subsequent regulation made clear that groups 
receiving funding could not counsel mothers to get abortions. Id. 
114 Id. at 177–82, 193, 200 (“The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively 
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same 
time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so doing, 
the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one 
activity to the exclusion of the other.”). 
115 515 U.S. at 833–34 (discussing Rust in a suit challenging university guidelines prohibiting the 
use of student funds for religious groups). The Rust decision itself did not explicitly state that family 
planning service providers were speaking for the government. This extension was based on other cases 
that are connected with Rust by the courts. See Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 
1998).  
116 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. 
117 Id. 
118 228 F.3d 1003, 1005, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000). 
119 Id. at 1012–13. In response to a school diversity initiative supporting gay and lesbian students, 
the teacher put together a bulletin board intended to promote the traditional family, stating sixty percent 
of Americans viewed homosexuality as immoral and quoting a passage from Leviticus that refers to 
homosexual relations as “detestable.” Id. at 1006–08. 
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convey oneself: among other things, content, timing, and purpose.”120 Only 
when the people have elected an individual does that individual have a 
right to speak as the government.121 This type of reasoning has also been 
applied to higher education122 and bears a striking resemblance to the 
reasoning of courts applying Garcetti to curricular speech.123 
4. Problems with Existing Doctrine.—While protecting curricular 
speech could be achieved without any change to existing Supreme Court 
precedent, the standards used by the circuit courts are fundamentally 
flawed. The Pickering standard simply does not provide significant 
protection for teachers.124 Whether or not Garcetti’s holding applies to 
teaching, the standard on its face states that employees receive protection 
only when speaking as citizens. While this could protect a teacher making 
an offhand remark during a lesson, it would be inconsistent to protect that 
remark while not protecting the thoughtfully assembled content of her 
lesson plans. How a teacher would indicate that she is speaking as a private 
citizen or teacher when in front of a classroom is also unclear. 
Pickering’s requirement of content about a public concern is similarly 
problematic. Courts have struggled to apply this test to educators. 
Expression that clearly implicates matters of political or social importance 
has been found to not touch on a matter of public concern.125 Second, the 
premise that all speech on matters of public concern should be protected in 
schools deserves questioning. Should a middle school math teacher be 
protected in taking time away from teaching algebra to devote a class to 
expressing his view on who should be the next President? The classroom 
provides a teacher with a captive audience for the purpose of carrying out 
specific educational goals—a teacher should not be allowed to abuse that 
power on a whim. Also, the facts of Pickering show that speech on a matter 
of public concern can be protected even if entirely inaccurate.126 Educators 
 
120 Id. at 1013. 
121 See id. at 1016. 
122 See Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Our conclusion that the 
First Amendment does not place restrictions on a public university’s ability to control its curriculum is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning the state’s ability to say what it wishes 
when it is the speaker.”). 
123 See Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he school 
system does not ‘regulate’ teachers’ speech as much as it hires that speech.”). 
124 For a discussion of why this speech should be protected, see infra Part II. 
125 See Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(holding that the choice to present a play dealing with homosexuality and single-parent families did not 
touch on a matter of public concern despite the clear social relevance of the issues—the court focused 
on the choice of curriculum in the abstract, instead of the specific characteristics of the play selected). 
126 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 582 (1968) (White, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The Court holds that truthful statements by a school teacher critical of the school 
board are within the ambit of the First Amendment. So also are false statements innocently or 
negligently made.”). 
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should not be allowed to mislead their students in the name of the First 
Amendment—such speech then goes to their competence, which is an 
appropriate basis for dismissal. 
The use of the Hazelwood standard also has problems in theory and 
application. Many of these issues stem from Hazelwood’s original purpose: 
analyzing the ability of schools to restrain student speech. While its origins 
do not make the Hazelwood analysis inherently inapplicable to teachers, 
several problems emerge in equating student and teacher classroom speech. 
Unlike students, teachers are professional pedagogues. And like the school 
administration in Hazelwood, teachers have legitimate pedagogical 
interests in the happenings of their classrooms. The Hazelwood Court did 
state that school officials may impose reasonable speech restrictions on 
students and teachers. However, it does not follow that an identical 
restriction would be reasonable for both, as the Court recognized that 
teachers have a distinct responsibility to educate young people.127 
Additionally, this test only assesses the concerns of the censor of speech, 
entirely ignoring the targets of censorship and their expression. Thus, 
Hazelwood provides no enclave of First Amendment protection when a 
teacher and administration have legitimate pedagogical differences. 
Likewise, courts have not been particularly rigorous in applying the 
“legitimate pedagogical concern” test to teacher speech. Many courts 
simply defer to the school administration or board in determining what is 
legitimate instead of actually analyzing whether the pedagogical concern 
truly supports the limitation on speech.128 This deference is understandable 
because judges are not required to be well versed in pedagogy; determining 
what is a legitimate pedagogical concern is outside their general 
competence. The test is also vague, providing no guidance as to what 
concerns are truly legitimate.129 
In addition to providing no protection for curricular speech, the Rust 
government speech approach fundamentally misunderstands the basic 
operational realities of public schools. Rust is concerned with the 
government’s ability to control the precise message of speech it subsidizes 
to prevent distortion. However, the government generally does not 
 
127 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (“This standard is consistent 
with our oft-expressed view that the education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of 
parents, teachers, and state and local school officials . . . .”). 
128 Many cases in the circuit courts have no significant discussion of whether the actions of the 
school board were the result of legitimate pedagogical concerns. See, e.g., Silano v. Sag Harbor Union 
Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723 (2d Cir. 1994) (reasoning that a teacher’s use of a video 
was not protected because it was “unnecessary”). 
129 See Boring, 136 F.3d at 371–72 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (“The dissenters [advocating 
adoption of the Hazelwood test] seize upon one loose, slippery, litigious phrase—‘legitimate 
pedagogical concern’—and consign it to the mercies of the federal courts. They provide not one iota of 
guidance to local school administrators on the interpretation of this tantalizing formulation, nor could 
they.”). 
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prescribe specific speech to educators. Most teachers are not provided with 
a script to follow in their classrooms. Instead, they receive their assigned 
curriculum, often in the form of a document, which guides their 
individualized instruction. These documents can vary widely from 
prescribing instruction on very specific content and concepts to more 
general topics to be covered.130 Often, such documents do not even suggest 
what materials would be helpful in engaging students on that topic. 
Teachers take the general topic or concept to be illustrated and create a 
lesson by independently drawing from a variety of resources. 
For example, suppose a teacher’s curriculum directs him to teach the 
causes of the French Revolution. An instructor may create a lesson that 
employs video clips, political cartoons depicting the three estates, and a 
dramatic reading from the writings of Robespierre. None of this curricular 
speech was dictated by the government. Rather, this process of developing 
daily lessons and selecting materials for the classrooms bears greater 
resemblance to a delegation of authority than to a prescription of conduct. 
Thus, Rust does not afford teachers the necessary latitude to implement 
their curriculum within the parameters of the authority they have been 
delegated. 
B. Academic Freedom: A Right to Teach 
In addition to free speech approaches, the concept of academic 
freedom is another potential source of protection for teachers’ curricular 
speech. In this context, academic freedom would protect the discretion of 
teachers, as professional educators, to run their classrooms as they see fit.131 
The Supreme Court first endorsed the doctrine of academic freedom in 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire.132 The Court found that a professor’s contempt 
conviction for refusing to answer questions pertaining to alleged subversive 
activities and academic lectures violated the professor’s constitutional 
rights.133 Academic freedom was considered vital for the development of 
 
130 For an illustration of typical curriculum documents, see Model Curriculum: English Language 
Arts (K–12), NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF EDUC., http://www.state.nj.us/education/modelcurriculum/ela/ (last 
visited June 2, 2013). 
131 See Donald F. Uerling, Academic Freedom in K–12 Education, 79 NEB. L. REV. 956, 956 
(2000) (defining academic freedom in K–12 education as “First Amendment protections of professional 
discretion that a public school teacher may exercise in the course of performing his or her teaching 
functions”). 
132 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion). Concurring and dissenting opinions had 
previously discussed notions of academic freedom. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 194–96 
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating “unwarranted inhibition upon the free spirit of teachers . . . 
has an unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to 
cultivate and practice” and calling teachers “the priests of our democracy”); Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 
U.S. 485, 508–11 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
133 See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 235–45 (plurality opinion). 
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American society.134 In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter specified 
four essential academic freedoms for a university: “who may teach, what 
may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to 
study.”135 The Court in Keyishian reaffirmed this doctrine by calling it a 
“special concern of the First Amendment.”136 
While not directly applying the academic freedom doctrine to primary 
and secondary classrooms, courts have used the rhetoric of academic 
freedom in discussing cases involving secondary school teachers.137 The 
First Circuit twice protected the expression of high school English teachers 
discussing vulgar language during lessons on academic freedom grounds.138 
But other circuits resisted the application of academic freedom in the 
content of classroom lessons.139 
Academic freedom protections are tenuous when imported from the 
university setting into primary and secondary schools. First, the doctrine 
itself is not well-defined or broadly applied even at the university level; the 
development of the academic freedom doctrine has arisen primarily from 
cases involving loyalty oaths for individual professors at public universities 
 
134 See id. at 250 (“The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is 
almost self-evident. . . . Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to 
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”). 
135 Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting CONFERENCE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNIV. OF CAPE TOWN AND THE UNIV. OF THE WITWATERSRAND, 
JOHANNESBURG, THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES OF SOUTH AFRICA 10–12 (1957)). 
136 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). The opinion in Sweezy discussed the 
First Amendment, but ultimately decided the case on the grounds of Fourteenth Amendment due 
process protection. See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 235, 255 (plurality opinion). 
137 The Supreme Court in Epperson v. Arkansas noted that the nation’s courts “have not failed to 
apply the First Amendment’s mandate in our educational system where essential to safeguard the 
fundamental values of freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief” and reasserted that courts should 
not tolerate “a pall of orthodoxy” in American classrooms. 393 U.S. 97, 104–05, 109 (1968) (quoting 
Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603) (holding that a state statute that criminalized teaching evolution in public 
schools violated the Establishment Clause). 
138 See Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361 (1st Cir. 1969) (protecting the discussion of “a 
vulgar term for an incestuous son” as used in an article in the Atlantic Monthly); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 
F. Supp. 1387, 1388 (D. Mass.), aff’d per curiam, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971) (protecting a teacher 
who wrote a vulgar word on the board in her classroom as part of a discussion of taboo words). 
139 See Cary v. Bd. of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 543 (10th Cir. 1979) (“Undoubtedly [teachers] have 
some freedom in the techniques to be employed, but this does not say that they have an unlimited 
liberty as to structure and content of the courses, at least at the secondary level.” (quoting Adams v. 
Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist., 511 F.2d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 1975))); see also Kirkland v. Northside 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Although the concept of academic freedom has 
been recognized in our jurisprudence, the doctrine has never conferred upon teachers the control of 
public school curricula.” (footnote omitted)). These cases noted that academic freedom protections had 
primarily been applied to the university setting and even there had not been applied to “curricular 
decisions” and “teaching related speech.” See id.; Cary, 598 F.2d at 539–40. 
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or institutional protections for the university itself.140 Additionally, the 
Court has not explained precisely how academic freedom and public 
employee speech analyses overlap.141 The cases applying academic freedom 
doctrine to secondary schools are limited to a small period of the 1960s and 
early 1970s, well before the Court’s decision in Hazelwood; it appears that 
analysis of curricular decisions was subsumed by free speech analysis.142 
It is also uncertain if the rationale behind broadly defined academic 
freedom is applicable in compulsory primary and secondary education. 
University students are generally adults who have chosen to be in a 
particular course of study at a particular university. University professors 
are charged with developing new and creative ideas that add to human 
understanding. This mission is different from that of a primary or 
secondary school teacher whose job focuses far more on the development 
of skills and core knowledge. Broad protections meant to promote the 
development of new and bold ideas are not necessary for primary and 
secondary schools to carry out their purpose. 
C. A Student’s Right to Hear 
While even more tenuous than academic freedom, another potential 
source of First Amendment protections for teachers is a student’s right to 
be exposed to diverse ideas and avoid indoctrination by teachers.143 This 
right to hear is derived from language in Tinker, stating that schools could 
not create “enclaves of totalitarianism” nor regard students “as closed-
circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate.”144 
This right was more explicitly stated in the plurality opinion in Board of 
Education v. Pico.145 The plurality acknowledged a right to receive ideas 
 
140 Anne Gardner, Note, Preparing Students for Democratic Participation: Why Teacher 
Curricular Speech Should Sometimes Be Protected by the First Amendment, 73 MO. L. REV. 213, 227 
(2008). 
141 Id. at 227–28. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke relied on academic freedom 
protections to support its conclusion that the state had a compelling interest in the freedom of the 
university to decide the composition of its student body. See 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978) (Powell, J.). 
142 The First Circuit in Ward cited the circuit’s previous academic freedom decisions, see supra 
note 138 and accompanying text, for the proposition that “postpublication retaliation must derive from 
some prior limitation. . . . [T]his circuit has long recognized a teacher’s right to notice of what 
classroom conduct is prohibited.” Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993). Additionally, one 
of these cases was cited as providing the factors used to determine the propriety of a school’s regulation 
of teacher speech. Id. at 452 (citing Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242, 1243 (1st Cir. 1971) (per 
curiam)). Thus, the First Circuit appears to have incorporated ideas of academic freedom into its free 
speech determination, suggesting that academic freedom per se is no longer the source of protection. 
143 See Daly, supra note 26, at 31 (“Students’ right to hear rests on a relatively uncertain judicial 
foundation.”). 
144 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 
145 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion). This case involved students suing the local school 
board after the board voted to remove a number of books, including Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-
Five, from the school library. See id. at 856–58 & n.3. 
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that “follows ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment right to send 
them,”146 and found that a school board could not simply remove books 
from a library because of partisan concerns.147 
Ironically, this decision actually muddied the overall protection of 
students’ rights while upholding them in the case before the Court. First, 
the holding was incredibly narrow, specifically stating it applied to the 
unique environment of the school library, not the classroom.148 The holding 
also only applied to books already in a school library, leading then-Justice 
Rehnquist to refer to the majority’s holding as enunciating “a curious 
entitlement” that “exists only in the library of the school, and only if the 
idea previously has been acquired by the school in book form.”149 
Using a student’s right to hear to protect curricular speech requires 
significant logical acrobatics. First, the right of a teacher to speak on 
controversial topics would have to be recognized as a corollary of a 
student’s right to hear about those topics. However, the Court stated a 
student’s right to hear flowed from the speaker’s initial right to speak. This 
logic results in a catch-22 in which a teacher’s freedom of expression is 
contingent on a student’s right to hear, which is in turn derived from a 
teacher’s right to speak. Additionally, the Court in Pico specifically applied 
this protection only to the library, not to the classroom. 
Given the multiplicity of underdeveloped and inconsistently applied 
First Amendment approaches to curricular speech protection discussed in 
this Part, a new standard is needed. While Garcetti left open the possibility 
of providing First Amendment protection for curricular speech, neither 
Garcetti nor any other Supreme Court decision has directly addressed the 
nature of that protection. Thus, Part II seeks to summarize the theoretical 
and practical concerns that inform the development of this new doctrine. 
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND PRAGMATIC CONCERNS 
Universal public education in America has been both a linchpin of 
economic and political success as well as a crucible for debates on societal 
values.150 As a result, there are many competing concerns that attach to 
 
146 Id. at 866–67 (reasoning “we have recognized that ‘the state may not, consistently with the 
spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge’” (quoting Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965))). 
147 See id. at 870–71. 
148 See id. at 868. This distinction seems to be at odds with the overall reasoning of the case. If a 
right exists to hear about certain topics through the books purchased with the school board’s approval 
for a library, it seems to follow that a teacher may receive some protection in telling the student about 
that same topic in a class. Otherwise, a teacher could by punished for simply reading aloud from a book 
found in a school’s own collection. 
149 Id. at 910 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
150 See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (relating to the broader 
discussion of separation of church and state in holding school-sponsored Bible reading 
unconstitutional); President John F. Kennedy, State of the Union Address (Jan. 14, 1963), available at 
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First Amendment rights in public schools. Starting with first principles, the 
Court has been clear that teachers have constitutional protections within the 
school151 and that schools should not be used to indoctrinate students;152 
“[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”153 Failing to provide any 
First Amendment protection to curricular speech would allow local schools 
to dictate the opinions that can be shared in their classrooms with relative 
impunity. 
While the Court has stated that teachers do not “shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate,”154 the exact contours of those rights have not been defined. The Court 
has articulated varying, often divergent interests concerning America’s 
public schools: (1) the need to preserve a marketplace of ideas and prepare 
students for participation in democratic government,155 (2) the need to 
socialize students and help them develop economically useful skills,156 and 
(3) the broad authority of local entities in determining appropriate 
curriculum and managing their employees.157 Additionally, there are always 
archetypically problematic teachers that courts have rightly feared will 
abuse the captive audiences in their classrooms.158 A standard properly 
defining First Amendment protections for curricular speech must balance 
these competing interests and concerns. 
A. The School as a Marketplace of Ideas 
An active, thriving democracy requires citizens to be exposed to 
diverse perspectives and to be able to think critically. America’s public 
schools play an important role in this preparation, and have been thought to 
do so since the Founding.159 The importance of creating a marketplace of 
 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-042-021.aspx (“The future of any country 
which is dependent upon the will and wisdom of its citizens is damaged, and irreparably damaged, 
whenever any of its children is not educated to the full extent of his capacity, from grade school through 
graduate school.”); President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-union-address (“But to 
prepare for the jobs of tomorrow, our commitment to skills and education has to start earlier.”). 
151 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
152 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640–41 (1943). 
153 Id. at 642. 
154 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
155 See infra Part II.A. 
156 See infra Part II.B. 
157 See infra Part II.C. 
158 See infra Part II.D. 
159 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in 10 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 161 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899) (“I know no safe depository of 
the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened 
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ideas in American schools finds support in American history and 
jurisprudence. Thomas Jefferson viewed public education as necessary to 
create freethinking citizens.160 Likewise, Benjamin Franklin advocated the 
discussion of “current controversies” in schools,161 and George Washington 
viewed the dissemination of knowledge as vital for Americans “to discern 
and provide against invasions of [their rights]; to distinguish between 
oppression and the necessary exercise of lawful authority.”162 
The Court has also latched onto the vision of the school as a 
marketplace of ideas: “The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained 
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers 
truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of 
authoritative selection.’”163 Justice Frankfurter noted that democracy is able 
to thrive “only if habits of open-mindedness and of critical inquiry are 
acquired in the formative years of our citizens.”164 The Court recognized 
that teachers need “wide discretion” to inspire students and inform their 
views on government, politics, and social issues.165 
This unique role of public education and public school teachers in a 
democracy differentiates curricular speech from a teacher’s expression in a 
 
enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, 
but to inform their discretion by education.”). 
160 See Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 185, 265–66 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944). 
161 Richard Rothstein & Rebecca Jacobsen, The Goals of Education, 88 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 264, 
267 (2006). 
162 President George Washington, First Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 8, 1790), in JARED 
SPARKS & GEORGE WASHINGTON, 12 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 10 (1837). 
163 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United States v. Associated 
Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)) (“The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of 
ideas.’”); see also Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 402 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (opinion of Elrod, 
J.) (“The habits and manners of a free people include tolerance and consideration of a range of political 
and religious views.”). 
164 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); accord Bethel 
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (“The role and purpose of the American public 
school system were well described by two historians, who stated: ‘[P]ublic education must prepare 
pupils for citizenship in the Republic. . . . It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values 
in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the 
community and the nation.’” (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE BEARDS’ NEW 
BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (William Beard ed., rev. ed. 1968))). 
165 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78–79 (1979) (“Within the public school system, teachers 
play a critical part in developing students’ attitude toward government . . . . Alone among employees of 
the system, teachers are in direct, day-to-day contact with students both in the classrooms and in the 
other varied activities of a modern school. In shaping the students’ experience to achieve educational 
goals, teachers by necessity have wide discretion over the way the course material is communicated to 
students. They are responsible for presenting and explaining the subject matter in a way that is both 
comprehensible and inspiring. . . . Thus, through both the presentation of course materials and the 
example he sets, a teacher has an opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government, 
the political process, and a citizen’s social responsibilities. This influence is crucial to the continued 
good health of a democracy.”). 
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staff meeting or a local bureaucrat’s discussion of her supervisor.166 
Without an enclave of First Amendment protection against majoritarian 
pressures, local entities could “cast a pall of orthodoxy over the 
classroom.”167 
B. The Socializing Function of Education 
Despite the importance of exposing students to diverse perspectives, 
legitimate countervailing interests suggest that curricular speech protection 
should not be absolute. The Court has recognized that schools play an 
important role in inculcating students with societal values.168 Contrary to 
the vision of the school as a marketplace of ideas, education performs a 
socializing function through which the basic norms and skills needed to 
function in society are passed along to students. Additionally, this function 
is meant to prepare young people for success in their future careers. 
The Court in Brown v. Board of Education stated that the school “is a 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing 
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to 
his environment.”169 While not specifying what values are properly 
imparted to children via public education,170 the Court has suggested that 
society uses public education to pass along current values and norms, a 
conservative notion that cuts against protection of a radical teacher freely 
spreading her ideology among students at the expense of developing their 
basic skills. 
C. The Importance of Local Control 
Finally, the Court has also been clear that judges are to defer to the 
control of local authorities in management of schools and creation of their 
curricula. Our federal system has largely left the implementation of public 
education to local municipalities.171 These local entities are democratically 
 
166 This Note does not argue that teachers in general deserve greater First Amendment rights than 
other public employees for noncurricular speech—a teacher’s expression outside the classroom does not 
implicate the separate interest of the state as educator. 
167 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603. 
168 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
169 Id.; see also Ambach, 441 U.S. at 77 (“Other authorities have perceived public schools as an 
‘assimilative force’ by which diverse and conflicting elements in our society are brought together on a 
broad but common ground. These perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental values 
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system have been confirmed by the observations 
of social scientists.” (citations omitted)). 
170 In fact, the Court has placed a number of restrictions on the extent to which K–12 schools can 
force students to conform to political or religious values. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 
(1968); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that a requirement 
that students recite the pledge of allegiance violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment). 
171 Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104 (“By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the 
control of state and local authorities.”). 
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elected, unlike individual teachers, and thus deserve substantial control 
over the curriculum.172 Additionally, courts have expressed concern about 
the inefficiency of judicial interference in the day-to-day operation of 
schools.173 A standard is needed that balances these varying concerns, 
allowing sufficient local control of the curriculum and its implementation 
to ensure that students receive appropriate instruction and skill 
development while also giving educators the ability to expose their students 
to a variety of ideas vital to becoming good citizens. 
D. Paradigmatic Problem Teachers 
In addition to these broader interests, courts have worried that teachers 
will abuse the captive audience found in a public school classroom.174 
These concerns tend to fall along three main lines. I will refer to them as 
the rogue teacher, the proselytizing teacher, and the inappropriate teacher. 
Courts have expressed significant concern about teachers using 
classroom time to discuss topics unrelated to the curriculum they were paid 
to teach.175 This concern about rogue teachers has validity. Often, a school 
is judged by how well its students perform on standardized tests and tailors 
its curriculum to improve test scores. Thus, a teacher’s decision to deviate 
from the curriculum for substantial periods can decrease those scores and 
lower the reputation of the school. Additionally, many curricula are 
designed so that courses build upon the knowledge a student should have 
gained in prior years. For example, a calculus class would be ineffective if 
the students’ algebra teachers had neglected to teach them how to factor. 
Teachers simply disregarding the curriculum can thus harm both school 
and student. 
 
172 See Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 371 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“[I]t 
is far better public policy . . . that the makeup of the curriculum be entrusted to the local school 
authorities who are in some sense responsible, rather than to the teachers, who would be responsible 
only to the judges, had they a First Amendment right to participate in the makeup of the curriculum.”). 
173 See, e.g., Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104 (“Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of 
conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply 
implicate basic constitutional values.”); Evans-Marshall II, 624 F.3d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(expressing concern that First Amendment protection for curricular speech would turn “run-of-the-mine 
curricular disputes into constitutional stalemates” requiring burdensome judicial oversight). 
174 See Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 968 (9th Cir. 2011); Mayer v. Monroe 
Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007). 
175 See Mayer, 474 F.3d at 479 (“A teacher hired to lead a social-studies class can’t use it as a 
platform for a revisionist perspective that Benedict Arnold wasn’t really a traitor, when the approved 
program calls him one; a high-school teacher hired to explicate Moby-Dick in a literature class can’t 
use Cry, The Beloved Country instead, even if Paton’s book better suits the instructor’s style and point 
of view; a math teacher can’t decide that calculus is more important than trigonometry and decide to let 
Hipparchus and Ptolemy slide in favor of Newton and Leibniz.”). 
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Additionally, courts have seen potential danger in protecting a teacher 
who uses his position as a pulpit.176 The trust imparted to teachers in 
shaping the minds of students can easily be misused.177 Distinct from 
simply exposing students to new ideas, educators may attempt to force their 
own religious or political views on their pupils. This threat certainly poses 
a real concern that teachers, cloaked in a degree of legitimacy and having 
control over students’ grades, may be able to abuse their positions if given 
overly broad free speech protections. To some, the answer to this problem 
is to give expansive power to school boards: “[I]f indoctrination is likely, 
the power should be reposed in someone the people can vote out of office, 
rather than tenured teachers.”178 However, this approach raises significant 
problems of its own, as majoritarian school boards could themselves 
engage in attempts to indoctrinate students, possibly with greater effect 
than a sole proselytizing teacher.179 Thus, any First Amendment standard 
 
176 See Johnson, 658 F.3d at 957 (“We consider whether a public school district infringes the First 
Amendment liberties of one of its teachers when it orders him not to use his public position as a pulpit 
from which to preach his own views on the role of God in our Nation’s history to the captive students in 
his mathematics classroom. The answer is clear: it does not.”); Mayer, 474 F.3d at 480 (“The 
Constitution does not entitle teachers to present personal views to captive audiences against the 
instructions of elected officials.”). 
177 There are numerous examples of free speech challenges concerning teachers presenting 
sectarian religious messages in their classrooms. See, e.g., Johnson, 658 F.3d at 958 (a math teacher had 
several large posters emphasizing the role of God in America’s founding documents); Webster v. New 
Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1005–06 (7th Cir. 1990) (a teacher presented Christian 
viewpoints on creation to his social studies class). 
178 Mayer, 474 F.3d at 479–80. 
179 The message of a single teacher can easily be ignored or countered by other teachers. However, 
a school board can mandate policy for every teacher a child is exposed to—potentially creating the very 
“pall of orthodoxy over the classroom” feared by the Court in Keyishian. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). This is particularly true when the teachers lack First Amendment protection 
for their curricular speech. While it is true that school boards are subject to democratic checks, some 
locales have majoritarian support for highly political or sectarian ideas. For example, according to a 
recent Gallup poll, 46% of Americans believe in new-earth creationism. Frank Newport, In U.S., 46% 
Hold Creationist View of Human Origins, GALLUP (June 1, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/155003/
hold-creationist-view-human-origins.aspx. It is likely that this number surpasses 50% in certain regions. 
Likewise, 52% of Republican voters in Mississippi polled in 2012 believed President Barack Obama is 
a Muslim, while only 12% affirmatively believed that he practices his actual religion, Christianity. 
Chris Moody, More than Half of Mississippi GOP Voters Say Obama is a Muslim, New Poll Suggests, 
YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 12, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/ticket/poll-more-half-mississippi-voters-
obama-muslim-192027518.html. Furthermore, partisan behavior often makes its way into education 
policy. In 2010 the Texas Board of Education approved a social studies curriculum that explicitly 
required emphasis of “the superiority of American capitalism,” teaching of McCarthyism alongside 
evidence of significant communist infiltration of government during the period, and teaching about “the 
conservative resurgence of the 1980s,” including figures like Phyllis Schlafly, while removing Thomas 
Jefferson from a list of figures who inspired eighteenth-century revolutions (likely due to his coining 
the phrase “separation of church and state”). James C. McKinley Jr., Conservatives on Texas Panel 
Carry the Day on Curriculum Change, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2010, at A10, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/03/13/education/13texas.html. While the Court has rejected certain school board 
107:1917 (2013) Cracking Open the Classroom Door 
1945 
should work to prevent indoctrination of students by either teacher or 
school board. 
Finally, courts are concerned about a teacher who exposes students to 
age-inappropriate material receiving First Amendment protection. There is 
always a danger that a teacher may exercise poor judgment and expose 
students to sexual or violent material that is inappropriate for their age or 
for the school environment generally.180 For example, the First Circuit has 
explicitly looked to the “age and sophistication” of students in determining 
whether curricular speech is appropriate.181 Each of these concerns must be 
addressed by any standard for determining whether the First Amendment 
protects specific curricular speech. 
III. A NEW STANDARD FOR CURRICULAR SPEECH 
Educators in primary and secondary schools should be given limited 
but well-defined First Amendment protections for their curricular speech. 
This Note proposes that a new standard should be developed that accounts 
for the competing interests and valid concerns regarding curricular speech 
protection. This approach takes cues from Pickering and Hazelwood—in 
particular, the First Circuit’s approach in Ward—to create a new test 
specifically tailored for curricular speech in public schools. 
A. The Proposed Test 
Whether curricular speech implicates First Amendment protections 
should be determined by balancing a teacher’s interest in speaking on 
matters of legitimate pedagogical concern against the school’s interest in 
providing an effective educational environment. This analysis would 
proceed in two steps. First, it must be determined if there is a legitimate 
pedagogical interest in an educator’s speech. This determination would be 
made pursuant to two inquiries. 
First, a court would ascertain whether the speech at issue is rationally 
related to a teacher’s assigned curriculum or established school 
programming.182 This inquiry is rather straightforward. A court would 
determine what curriculum—as defined by the school board and the 
 
decisions as violative of the Establishment Clause, see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968), 
this protection does not apply to political manipulation. 
180 See, e.g., Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 721 (2d Cir. 
1994) (showing a film clip with nude actors in a sophomore math class); Kenney v. Genesee Valley Bd. 
of Coop. Educ. Servs., No. 07-CV-6442 CJS, 2008 WL 343110, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2008) 
(showing a graphic clip of a man committing suicide to demonstrate the properties of ballistics). 
181 Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993). 
182 “School programming” refers to any initiative, activity, or sport specifically authorized by a 
school. For example, many schools have character-education initiatives. By including these programs in 
the test, teachers may receive protection in facilitating a discussion related to that initiative within their 
classrooms. 
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teacher’s supervisors in both written documents and informal 
communications—the teacher was tasked with implementing at the time of 
the speech in question. Then, the court would scrutinize the speech in 
question and determine if it was rationally related to this curriculum. 
Second, the court would determine whether the speech complied with 
viewpoint-neutral school policies of which the teacher is on notice. School 
policies could be ascertained from a variety of sources, including state 
laws, employee manuals, office memoranda, and communications between 
a teacher and his supervisors. Next, a court would determine if these 
policies facially discriminated against a particular point of view. If so, the 
policy would be invalid and excluded from the remainder of the analysis. 
Finally, notice would be determined by examining whether a teacher would 
be reasonably expected to have actual or constructive notice of the policy. 
If the teacher’s speech meets both of these standards, the court would 
then proceed to balance these interests against the school’s interest in 
providing an effective educational environment. Schools are mandated with 
providing the best education possible, and this standard specifically focuses 
on the needs of students. If the speech at issue harms student learning—for 
example, via poor quality instruction or introduction to age-inappropriate 
material—that effect should factor into the courts’ ultimate determination. 
Also relevant is whether the speech would emotionally harm a reasonable 
student of that age. This standard explicitly targets harm to students, not 
conflicts between teachers and either parents or supervisors.183 
Additionally, if the school board or administrators specifically authorized 
the speech at issue, a strong presumption should exist that the speech did 
not harm the educational environment; both teacher and supervisor agreed 
ex ante that the expression was acceptable. 
B. Balancing in Practice 
The operation of this test is best illustrated by applying it to existing 
case law. While the published decisions in many past cases lack the 
relevant facts needed for application of the proposed standard, several cases 
provide opportunities to explore its operation—among these are Mayer v. 
Monroe County Community School Corp.,184 Boring v. Buncombe County 
Board of Education,185 and Johnson v. Poway Unified School District.186 
The curricular speech found in Mayer would be protected under the 
proposed standard. Ms. Mayer’s speech satisfies both inquiries in step one. 
The discussion of peace was rationally related to her curriculum; the 
 
183 While parents are not included explicitly in this test, their views in the aggregate are included 
by proxy. Parents can and do participate in the operation of local schools through school board meetings 
and elections, which directly impact the specific curricular choices of a district. 
184 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007). 
185 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
186 658 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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newsletter that contained the article on peace protests was a part of her 
curriculum.187 Also, the record does not indicate that a school policy 
requiring her to avoid discussion of peace, the Iraq War, or personal 
political opinions generally had been communicated to the staff at the time 
of her speech. Even if her principal’s later ban on discussing peace had 
been in place at the time, her speech would still be protected because the 
policy lacked viewpoint neutrality.188 Only a policy banning all discussion 
of the war or political beliefs would disqualify the speech from protection. 
In step two, there is no evidence in the case that her speech damaged the 
learning environment for her students. The speech at issue was very brief, 
and complaints came only from one set of parents with opposing political 
viewpoints, not her students.189 
Similarly, the curricular speech in Boring would likely be protected 
under this standard. In choosing a play for her high school theater class, 
Ms. Boring was carrying out the curriculum assigned to her. Not only did 
she comply with school policies, she actually got permission from her 
supervisor in advance of choosing the play.190 While a colorable argument 
can be made that exposure to a play involving teen pregnancy, 
homosexuality, and dysfunctional families could be emotionally harmful, 
this would be unlikely to succeed. First, the school principal specifically 
authorized the performance of the play, creating a strong presumption that 
the play was not harmful. Additionally, participants in the play were high 
school students in an advanced acting class191 (likely an elective)—students 
of that age are generally aware of issues pertaining to sexuality and family 
strife. 
The facts of Johnson demonstrate a scenario in which curricular 
speech falls outside the scope of the First Amendment. In Johnson, a high 
school mathematics teacher was forced to remove several large banners 
that emphasized the importance of God in America’s founding 
documents.192 This speech fails both step-one inquiries. Even if the speech 
were found to be political rather than religious, it bore no rational 
relationship to the teaching of mathematics. Also, both preexisting school 
district policy and state law of which the teacher should have been aware 
contained provisions prohibiting the expression.193 Thus, this speech would 
not be protected. 
 
187 See Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 1:04-CV-1695-SEB-VSS, 2006 WL 693555, 
at *2 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2006). 
188 See id. at *3. 
189 Id. at *2–3. 
190 Boring, 136 F.3d at 375–76 (Motz, J., dissenting). 
191 See id. at 366 (majority opinion). 
192 See Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 957–59 (9th Cir. 2011). 
193 See id. at 959. The school policy instructed teachers to “refrain from using classroom teacher 
influence to promote partisan or sectarian viewpoints” and the state law stated that religious references 
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These examples demonstrate how the proposed standard would deal 
with past cases. With the basic operation of the test illustrated, the next 
section will examine its potential benefits and drawbacks. 
C. Benefits of the Proposed Approach 
The proposed test provides a limited but well-defined protection for 
curricular speech that has a number of distinct advantages over existing 
approaches. These benefits fall into three general categories: (1) proper 
balancing of interests, (2) a focus on institutional competency, and (3) 
practical benefits for educators. Each of these categories shall be discussed 
in turn. 
First, this test properly balances the tension between maintaining a 
marketplace of ideas in schools with proper deference to local control and 
the need for basic socialization. The very existence of protection for 
curricular speech promotes the marketplace of ideas. More specifically, a 
teacher’s ability to speak on matters rationally related to her curriculum 
ensures that any topic assigned to her can be viewed from multiple 
perspectives. Though the school can still create a policy limiting certain 
speech, it must do so on a viewpoint-neutral basis; the school may be able 
to prevent Ms. Mayer from discussing the Iraq War, but if she is allowed to 
discuss it, she can expose students to multiple perspectives, lessening 
concerns about indoctrination. However, the balancing step prevents this 
protection from becoming overly inclusive; speech that would harm a 
reasonable student or that simply demonstrates poor quality of instruction 
would fall outside the First Amendment. 
Additionally, using the established curriculum as the anchor of 
protection gives proper deference to the control of local authorities. The 
curriculum assigned to a teacher embodies the will of the local school 
board and state authorities. A school board can then specify which topics it 
does and does not want covered. A school that wants to exert greater 
control over the content of a politically charged subject, like American 
government, can give very specific instructions, while a school that wants 
to give its teachers more leeway can give broad directives. Likewise, 
excluding speech unrelated to the curriculum ensures the First Amendment 
will not become an excuse for teachers to neglect developing their students’ 
basic skills. 
It could be argued that the proposed standard actually provides too 
much deference to local control. As the standard for First Amendment 
protection varies with school board decisions about curriculum and policy, 
schools could theoretically put in place draconian measures to limit a 
teacher’s autonomy. Several factors work as a check against this kind of 
 
are proper only when “incidental to or illustrative of matters properly included in the course of study.” 
Id. at 959 & n.5 (citing CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51511 (West 2006)). 
107:1917 (2013) Cracking Open the Classroom Door 
1949 
control. First, the test itself requires viewpoint neutrality in regulations—if 
the policy is facially biased toward a particular political party or religious 
sect, a teacher’s speech may still be protected. A school would have to limit 
speech on topics it does want to promote in order to suppress the speech it 
dislikes, increasing the burden in imposing a limit. Also, there are 
constitutional limitations on the conduct of school boards that come from 
outside the Free Speech Clause; both the First Amendment’s Establishment 
Clause194 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause195 have 
been used to limit the actions of local education authorities and can check 
the most egregious actions. 
Finally, a practical check on school boards imposing draconian 
limitations is the threat of diminishing educational quality. School boards 
and administrators have a strong interest in the performance of their 
students; poor performance can cost them their jobs through political 
pressure or legal sanction.196 If a good teacher feels overly burdened by 
regulation, he can take his talents elsewhere. Inferior teaching quality can 
substantially lower student achievement.197 The interests of administrators 
and school boards in providing a quality education would act as a check 
against abuse. 
Also, requiring curricular speech to comply with school policy allows 
school administrators to set basic standards for educator conduct. A school 
would be free to require special permission for movies of a certain rating, 
ban the use of profanity, as well as prohibit teachers from advancing their 
own sectarian beliefs in classrooms. Policies of this sort would prevent an 
inappropriate teacher or proselytizing teacher from receiving First 
Amendment protection. Also, this approach naturally accounts for a 
student’s increasing maturity, as curricula tend to be set for specific courses 
offered to students of specific ages. The rational relationship requirement 
also accounts for the problem of rogue teachers; spending class time 
exploring topics unrelated to their curriculum would fail this test. 
Second, the proposed standard is consistent with the differing 
competencies of educators and courts. At base, schools are experts in 
 
194 See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968) (holding a state statute that prohibited 
teaching evolution in public schools unconstitutional on Establishment Clause grounds). 
195 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400, 403 (1923) (holding that a Nebraska law 
outlawing foreign language education violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
196 See supra note 15 and accompanying text discussing the punishments that can result from 
failure to comply with No Child Left Behind. 
197 A recent empirical study relating student outcomes to teacher quality demonstrated that 
replacing a poor teacher with a higher quality one would increase the net lifetime income of a single 
class by more that $250,000. Raj Chetty et al., The Long-Term Impacts of Teachers: Teacher Value-
Added and Student Outcomes in Adulthood 47 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
17699, 2011), available at http://obs.rc.fas.harvard.edu/chetty/value_added.pdf. Students with higher 
quality teachers are also more likely to go to college and less likely to have children as teenagers than 
their similarly situated peers. See id. at 4, 36. 
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pedagogy and courts are experts in legal analysis. This test places the core 
pedagogical determinations in the hands of the schools. Instead of allowing 
courts to speculate about what a legitimate pedagogical purpose is, this 
standard allows educators creating a curriculum or a school policy to make 
the relevant determinations; schools are in charge of creating both the 
curricula and the policies that underpin the two inquiries into legitimate 
pedagogical concern. The court then takes this curriculum and policy and 
relates them to the facts of the case using well-established modes of legal 
analysis: determining rational relationships,198 evaluating viewpoint 
neutrality,199 determining whether the language of a text reaches a particular 
situation,200 and balancing competing interests.201 
Finally, this new standard would create several additional practical 
benefits for educators. First, the standard is written in language that 
teachers and administrators can understand. The vast majority of teachers 
have never taken a class in law,202 but they do know the ins and outs of their 
schools’ curricula and policies. Teachers can be confident in employing 
diverse methods in the classroom if they teach their assigned curriculum 
and follow school rules. Conversely, administrators gain clarity regarding 
the circumstances under which they can take disciplinary action against a 
teacher without violating the Constitution. Additionally, the first step’s 
notice requirement incentivizes schools to develop clear, well-
communicated polices. This approach would encourage schools to be 
proactive and create policies (preferably written) that are clearly 
communicated to their staffs to avoid potential liability. This new standard 
 
198 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that rational basis review under 
the Equal Protection Clause requires a classification to bear a “rational relationship to legitimate state 
interests”). 
199 See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) 
(“Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long 
as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint 
neutral.”). 
200 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (requiring that courts, in 
evaluating agency regulations, determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question 
at issue”). The first step in this proposed test actually bears a resemblance to Chevron analysis. In both, 
an elected body (Congress or a school board) has delegated some of its authority to another party 
(agency or a teacher). The court determines whether or not a statement by the elected body (law or 
curriculum) has directly addressed an act by the party (rulemaking or curricular speech) to whom that 
body has delegated authority. If the elected body has not spoken to the act, then the court determines if 
the party acted reasonably given its prior direction. Cf. id. at 842–44. 
201 See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (balancing public employees’ 
speech interests against public employers’ interest in the efficiency of public services). 
202 One study found that 75% of teachers have never taken a class in school law. David Schimmel 
& Matthew Militello, Legal Literacy for Teachers: A Neglected Responsibility, 77 HARV. EDUC. 
REV. 257, 262 (2007). Even with a basic understanding of legal concepts, the convoluted nature of First 
Amendment protection under current law would likely make it difficult for educators to know what the 
First Amendment does and does not protect. 
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for curricular speech would give educators much-needed certainty 
concerning their First Amendment rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The long-term economic and political success of the United States 
rests largely on the shoulders of our public education system. Teachers are 
on the front lines of public education and should be able to expose young 
people to a wide variety of ideas within the bounds of the curriculum they 
are assigned to teach. Currently, First Amendment jurisprudence in this 
area is deeply conflicted and poorly developed. This Note proposes a new 
standard specifically designed for the realities of public schools: balancing 
a teacher’s interest in speaking on matters of legitimate pedagogical 
concern against the school’s interest in providing an effective educational 
environment. Determining what is a matter of legitimate pedagogical 
concern is not left to jurists but to pedagogues through the creation of 
curriculum and viewpoint-neutral school policies. 
This new standard for curricular speech is designed to maintain a 
marketplace of ideas within America’s schools while still respecting the 
important socializing function of schools and giving deference to local 
control. By providing clear, but limited, protection for a teacher’s curricular 
speech, this standard would provide much-needed clarity to this area of the 
law and limit the ability of majoritarian bodies to “cast a pall of orthodoxy” 
over the nation’s public schools.203 
  
 
203 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
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